We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
Introduction
In games with incomplete information, the private information of each agent is represented by his type. The type of each agent contains information about the preferences of the agents and information about the beliefs of the agents. The type of agent can therefore be decomposed into a payo type and a belief type. The payo type of an agent embodies information about the players payo and the belief type embodies information about the players' belief and higher order beliefs. In games with incomplete information, the strategy of an agent may naturally depend on his entire type, namely his payo type and his belief type. In large type spaces, and certainly in the universal type space, each agent may have di erent belief types associated with the same payo type. The prediction of play in a game of incomplete information may therefore be sensitive to the payo type as well as the belief type.
In this paper we consider three solution concepts for games of incomplete information which depend only on the payo types but not on the belief types of the agent. The three solution concepts are (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. As these solution concepts do not depend on the beliefs and higher order beliefs of the agent, we refer to them as belief free solution concepts. Having de ned the solution concepts, we give their epistemic foundations and establish relationships between the solution concepts. We then use these solution concepts in supermodular games and potential games with incomplete information. We should emphasize that these solution concepts have already been de ned in the literature.
Rather, the contribution of this paper is to present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish their relationship to each other.
The notion of ex post equilibrium is the most demanding among the three solution concepts. The term \ex post equilibrium" is due to Cremer and McLean (1985) . 1 It requires that in equilibrium, the strategic choice of each type of each player remains a best response ex post, that is after the payo type of each agent has become public. The ex post equilibrium is frequently used as solution concept in mechanism design where the game is speci cally designed so as to support truthtelling as an ex post equilibrium (e.g. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Bergemann and V• alim• aki (2002) ).
In earlier work, Bergemann and Morris (2005) showed that the ex post equilibrium can 1 Earlier, D'Aspremont and Gerard- Varet (1979) de ne the same notion in a private value environment as uniform equilibrium and Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) refer to uniform incentive compatibility in the direct mechanism of an interdependent value environment.
be understood as a solution concept which embeds robustness to beliefs and higher order beliefs in the following sense: a social choice function can be truthfully implemented in every type space in an interim equilibrium if and only if it can be truthfully implemented as an ex post equilibrium. The ex post equilibrium is thus a belief free solution concept as it requires that the strategies of the players remain an equilibrium for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs. The objective of this paper is to describe belief free solution concepts in a general game theoretic environment. Here, and in contrast to the mechanism design environment, the notion of an ex post equilibrium is very demanding and in many games an ex post equilibrium does not exist. We shall therefore de ne and analyze weaker solution concepts, namely incomplete information correlated equilibrium and incomplete information rationalizability. In games with a nite number of actions and a nite number of payo types, the existence of these solution concepts is proved by construction.
We say that an action is incomplete information rationalizable for a payo type of an agent if it survives the process of iteratively elimination of dominated strategies. The notion of incomplete information rationalizability is belief free as the candidate action needs only to be a best response to some beliefs about the other agents actions and payo types. This solution concept was studied under this name in Battigalli (1999) ; his work was incorporated in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) , where \ -rationalizability" is used to refer to a general dynamic version of rationalizability and refers to common knowledge restrictions on beliefs. It is important to emphasize that the rationalizability of an action is de ned with respect to the payo type rather than the type of an agent as in the notions of interim rationalizability of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) and Ely and Peski (2006) .
We say that a strategy pro le forms an incomplete information correlated equilibrium if there exists some distribution over payo types and actions such that every action taken by a payo type of an agent is a best response given the distribution over payo types and actions. The notion of incomplete information correlated equilibrium corresponds (up to some minor di erences) to the universal Bayesian solution suggested in Forges (1993) .
The epistemic foundations of incomplete information rationalizability and incomplete information correlated equilibrium present the natural generalizations of their complete information counterparts by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987) , respectively.
In proposition 1 we show that a speci c action of a payo type is incomplete information rationalizable if and only if there exists type space and an interim equilibrium such that the message is an equilibrium action for a type with a given payo type in the type space.
Also in proposition 1, we show that an action is an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium for a payo type of an agent if and only if there exists a type space with a common prior for which the speci c message is a Bayes Nash equilibrium action for a type with that payo type in the hierarchical type space. With respect to the ex post equilibrium, we show that a strategy pro le forms an ex post equilibrium if and only if the strategies of the payo types remain interim equilibrium strategies on all type spaces.
The three solution concepts are nested in the appropriate manner. We show that if for a given payo type, an action is an element of an ex post equilibrium pro le, then it is also an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium for the given payo type.
Likewise, if an action is an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium for a given payo type, then it is also incomplete information rationalizable for the given payo type.
In the case of supermodular games, the relationships between these three solution con- We restrict our attention to solution concepts for normal form (or static) games. In contrast, Kalai (2004) and Borgers and McQuade (2007) develop belief free solution concepts for extensive form games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the belief free solution concepts in a nite environment. Section 3 gives the relevant de nitions for compact action and payo type spaces. We also consider a common interest game with quadratic payo s to apply the solution concepts. Section 4 presents the epistemic foundations of the solution concepts. Section 5 establishes some relations between these solution concepts in general games. Section 6 obtains additional results in supermodular games. Section 7 considers Bayesian potential games and presents conditions for a unique incomplete information correlated equilibrium. Section 8 concludes.
Belief Free Solution Concepts
There are I players. We report natural generalizations of the complete information solution concepts of (correlated) rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
De nition 1 (Incomplete Information Rationalizability)
The incomplete information rationalizable actions R = (R i )
for each k = 1; 2; :::; and
This solution concept was studied under this name in Battigalli (1999) ; this work was incorporated in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) , where \ -rationalizability" is used to refer to a general dynamic version of rationalizability and refers to common knowledge restrictions on beliefs. Their de nition reduces to the one above in a static setting when is the empty set. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) assumed that all payo relevant variables are known by some agent, so, in our language, the set 0 is a singleton. This solution concept has played an important role in our work on robust full implementation (see Bergemann and Morris (2001) , Bergemann and Morris (2007a) and Bergemann and Morris (2007b) ). Note that R i ( i ) is non-empty for each i and i 2 i by construction.
De nition 2 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution 2 (A ) is an incomplete information correlated equilibrium
Many incomplete information versions of correlated equilibrium have been de ned: Forges (1993) proposed ve "legitimate" ones. The above de nition corresponds to the most general in Forges (1993) -i.e., the universal Bayesian approach of section 6. She does not explicitly incorporate "payo types", i.e., payo relevant variables that are known by one agent. Thus, in our language, it is as if each i were a singleton. She notes in proposition 4 that the set of payo s that might arise under this solution concept is equal to the set of payo s that might arise under more stringent solutions concepts if players are allowed to observe some su ciently rich private signals.
Forges (1993) deals with two player games, but Forges (2006) discusses the straightforward extension to many players;
here she refers to the solution concept as the "Bayesian solution" of the game. The type correlated equilibria of Cotter (1994) are essentially equivalent to this de nition, with the proviso that he xes the prior distribution on , so the equilibrium describes a distribution on A conditional on each realized . 2
Every game has an ICE: it is enough to x any 2 , let = ( i )
any Nash equilibrium of the complete information game (u i ( ; ))
, and let
Moreover, for any 2 ( ), there exists an ICE whose marginal on is : for every
In an earlier paper, Cotter (1991) , analyzes the notion of a correlated equilibrium with type dependent strategies. In the correlated equilibrium with type dependent strategies the randomization device is restricted to be independent of the type of each player. In the current de nition we allow the correlation device to depend on the type pro le realization.
be any Nash equilibrium of the complete information game (u i ( ; ))
We denote the set of actions taken by payo type i of agent i in some incomplete information correlated equilibrium by C i ( i ), so formally we have
We de ne an ex post equilibrium. A payo type strategy for player i is a function
De nition 3 (Ex Post Equilibrium)
A payo type strategy pro le s = (s i )
is an ex post equilibrium if for all i and all , we have
for all a i 2 A i :
"Most" games will not have ex post equilibria. But the solution concept has been extensively studied in the mechanism design literature (where the game is constructed to have ex post equilibria). In particular, truthtelling is an ex post equilibrium in a direct mechanism if and only if it is ex post incentive compatible. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) is an early reference dealing with ex post incentive compatibility (under the name "uniform incentive compatibility"). Ex post equilibrium has recently been studied in general game theory contexts (see, e.g., Kalai (2004) and Borgers and McQuade (2007) ).
Compact Action and Type Spaces and an Example
Let the framework be as before except that each A i and i are compact intervals of the real line and each u i is continuous in a and . We let 0 be a singleton and thus do not refer to it.
Solution Concepts
The de nition of rationalizability becomes:
De nition 4 (Incomplete Information Rationalizability)
The compactness and continuity assumptions ensure that R i ( i ) is well-de ned and trans-nite iterations are not required.
De nition 5 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution 2 (A ) is an incomplete information correlated equilibrium (ICE) of u if for each i and each measurable i :
We de ne C i ( i ) -the set of actions that can be played by type i in an incomplete information correlated equilibrium of game u -for the compact action and type spaces case of this section. We will say that a i 2 C i ( i ) if for each " > 0, there exists an ICE with
Quadratic Example
for some 2 R. Note that this is a common interest game. Now suppose agent i has type i and belief i 2 (A i i ). Then his expected utility from choosing action a i is
Setting this equal to zero gives agent i's best response:
In this game, we have
and
and there is a unique ex post equilibrium s with s i ( i ) = i for all i 2 [0; 1].
The rationalizability claim can be shown by the following inductive step, let
and was shown (in a mechanism design application) as the leading example in Bergemann and Morris (2007a). If < 0, then the game has strategic complementarities and well known arguments imply that there will not be a gap between extremal rationalizable outcomes and correlated equilibria. Thus 1 I 1 < will remain a tight characterization for correlated equilibria for 0. If 1, it is easy to show that every action can be element of a correlated equilibrium. Later arguments will establish the claim of
Epistemic Foundations for the Solution Concepts
These belief free solution concepts are of interest not because we think that players don't have beliefs and higher order beliefs, but because we do not know what they are. In this section, we review results that explain why it make sense to use these solution concepts as a reduced form description of what might happen in more fully speci ed environments with beliefs and higher order beliefs. We return to the nite case to avoid technicalities.
Type Spaces
A type space T is de ned as T , We write T = T 1 T I and
and t i = (t 1 ; :::; t i 1 ; t i+1 ; :::; t I ); we let b :
A type space T has a common prior 2 (T 0 ) if, for all i and t i 2 T i , X 
for all t i 2 T i and 0 2 0 . A type space T is a common prior type space if there exists 2 (T ) such that T has common prior . A type space T is a payo type space if each T i = i and each b i is the identity map. A type space T is a full support type space
Interim Equilibrium
The belief free incomplete information game u and type space T together de ne an incomplete information game which may not have a common prior. A behavioral strategy of player i in type space T is given by a function i : T i ! (A i ). We write i for the set of behavioral strategies of player i.
De nition 6 (Interim Equilibrium)
Strategy pro le is an interim equilibrium of (u;
De nition 7 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium)
Strategy pro le is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for type space T with common prior if for each i and alternative strategy 0 i ,
As is well known, this ex ante de nition of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is equivalent to interim equilibrium on common prior type spaces. But in the absence of a common prior, there is not a natural ex ante de nition of the incomplete information equilibrium.
Epistemic Results
We denote the set of actions played by agent i with payo type i in some interim equilibrium on some type space T by S i ( i ). So
9 a type space T , an interim equilibrium, , of (u; T ) , and a type t i 2 T i such that b i (t i ) = i and i (a i jt i ) > 0
)
.
We denote the set of actions played by agent i with payo type i in some interim equilibrium on some common prior type space T by S CP i ( i ). So
9 a common prior type space T , an interim equilibrium, , of (u; T ) , and a type t i 2 T i such that b i (t i ) = i and i (a i jt i ) > 0 ) .
The following proposition records the straightforward incomplete information generalizations of the epistemic foundations for rationalizability and correlated equilibrium, respectively, from Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987) .
Proposition 1 (Epistemic Foundations)
For all i and for all i ,
Proof. For part (1), x (i) a type space
; (ii) an interim equilibrium of (u; T ) and (iii) a type t i 2 T i with (a)
Now for each i, i in the range of b i and a i 2 S i ( i ), let
Now because is an equilibrium,
Now we show by induction on k that S i ( i ) R k i ( i ) for all i; i and k. This is true for k = 0 by de nition. Suppose that it is true for k. Now i ;a i i ( i ; a i ) > 0 implies that a i 2 S i f0;ig , by construction, which implies a i 2 R k i f0;ig by the inductive hypothesis. Together with (4), this establishes a i 2 R k+1 i ( i ). This proves the induction. Now a i 2 S i ( i ) R i ( i ), proving the \if" claim of the proposition.
Conversely, suppose that a i 2 R i ( i ). Observe that for each i, i and a i 2 R i ( i ), there
Now construct (i) a type space T with
where (a) above ensures that this is well-de ned, and (ii) a strategy pro le with
is an equilibrium and by construction t i = ( i ; a i ) 2 T i with b i (t i ) = i ; and i (t i ) [a i ] > 0. This establishes the \only if" part.
For part (2), rst suppose that a i 2 C i ( i ). Thus there exists an ICE 2 (A ) and (a i ; i ) 2 A i i such that ((a i ; a i ) ; ( i ; i )) > 0. Now we construct a type space. Let
De ne 2 (T ) by
Observe that is a common prior for T by construction. Now consider the strategy pro le for the game (u; T ) de ned by
By construction, is an interim equilibrium of (u; T ). Now consider the type t i = (a i ; i ).
We have constructed a common prior type space T , an interim equilibrium, , of (u; T ),
Conversely, suppose that a i 2 S CP i ( i ). Thus there exists a common prior type space T with prior , an interim equilibrium, , of (u; T ), such that b i (t i ) = i and i (a i jt i ) > 0.
De ne 2 (A ) by
By construction, is an ICE. Since the prior assigns positive probability to every type, we have that ((a i ; a i ) ; ( i ; i )) > 0 for some (a i ; i ) 2 A i i and thus a i 2 C i ( i ).
Part (1) is a special case of propositions 4.2 and 4.3 in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) , and is a straightforward generalization of the complete information argument in Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) . We recorded this result earlier as proposition 6 in the appendix of Bergemann and Morris (2007b) . Part (2) is a straightforward generalization of the complete information argument of Aumann (1987) ; while Forges (1993) does not state a result in exactly this form, this argument captures the idea of the incomplete information generalization of Aumann's analysis in Forges (1993) section 6.
The next proposition describes how we can formalize the idea that the solution concept of ex post equilibrium makes sense if we want to identify behavior that will constitute an equilibrium whatever players' beliefs and higher order beliefs about others' payo types and unknown payo relevant states. Write s;T for the strategy pro le in (u; T ) induced by s, so that
Proposition 2 (Ex Post Equilibrium)
The following are equivalent:
1. s is an ex post equilibrium 2. s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u; T ) for all type spaces T 3. s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u; T ) for all full support common prior payo type spaces T Proof.
(1) ) (2). We verify that s;T satis es the de nition of an interim equilibrium (see de nition 6) on an arbitrary type space: for each i; t i and a i ,
by de nition of
(2) ) (3). This is true by de nition.
(3) ) (1). Let each T i = i and b i be the identity map. For any 2 ++ ( ), consider the type space
, where each b i is derived from by Bayes rule as in equation (2) on page 10. This type space is a full support common prior payo type space. Fix 2 and let k be any sequence of full support priors with k ( ) ! 1 as k ! 1. Now suppose that (3) holds, so s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u; T k ) for each k = 1; 2; ::: . Then for each i,
for all a i and k = 1; 2; ::: . Now k ( ) ! 1 implies:
This conclusion holds for each 2 , i and a i . This proves (1).
If we restrict attention to the special case where the game is a direct revelation mechanism and a planner is trying to implement a social choice function, this is a special case of results in our earlier work on robust mechanism design, Bergemann and Morris (2005) : the arguments there do not depend on the mechanism design application and the arguments there prove the result in a general game theoretic setting. 3 In a private values environment, this result relates to earlier observation in the mechanism design literature showing the equivalence between \Bayesian equilibrium for all beliefs" and dominant strategies equilibrium, e.g., Ledyard (1979) . Borgers and McQuade (2007) have stated results along these lines for general games.
In particular, they de ne s to be a strongly information invariant equilibrium if claim (2) of the proposition holds. Thus their proposition 1 establishes the equivalence of (1) and (2). They de ne s to be a weakly information invariant equilibrium if s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u; T ) for all type spaces T where each type of every player puts positive probability on his opponents having any payo type pro le. Their proposition 2 shows that s is an ex post equilibrium if and only if it is a weakly information invariant equilibrium.
Note that claim (3) in the above proposition is in principle a stronger claim than that s is a weakly information invariant equilibrium.
Relations Between Solution Concepts
We want to collect together some results on the relation between the belief free solution concepts.
Write 2 ( ) for a distribution over payo type pro les. Write for the distribution over payo types generated by , i.e.,
For any 2 ( ) and payo type strategy pro le s, we write ;s for the induced probability distribution over A , i.e.,
;s (a; ) =
0, otherwise.
Lemma 1
If 2 ++ ( ) and a i 2 C i ( i ), then there exists an ICE such that:
Proof. If a i 2 C i ( i ), then by de nition there exists an ICE 0 such that 0 ((a i ; a i ) ;
choosing " positive but su ciently small so that e 2 ( ). Let e be any ICE with e = e . Now let (a; ) = (1 ") e (a; ) + " 0 (a; ). By construction, has the two properties of the lemma.
By de nition:

Lemma 2
If s is an ex post equilibrium of u, then, for any 2 ( ), ;s is an ICE of u.
And an immediate corollary is:
Corollary 1 Suppose that s is an ex post equilibrium of u and, for every 2 ( ), there is at most one ICE with = . Then is an ICE if and only if = ;s .
We can also record some natural inclusions.
Lemma 3
For all i and i 2 i ,
Proof.
(1) follows immediately from de nitions; (2) follows from lemma 2.
Proposition 3
Suppose that each C i is single valued, i.e., there exists payo strategy pro le s = (s i )
such that for all i and all i , C i ( i ) = fs i ( i )g. Then 1. if is an ICE, then there exists 2 ( ) such that = ;s ; and 2. s is an ex post equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that C i ( i ) = fs i ( i )g for all i and i . Let be any ICE. So 
Supermodular Games
In this section, we let 0 be a singleton and suppress reference to 0 . Now suppose that each action set and type set is complete ordered; there are increasing di erences in actions, so that for each 2 ,
if a i a 0 i and a i a 0 i ; and there are increasing di erences in own action and states, so that for each a i 2 A i ,
Say that a game u is generic if arg max
is single value for each a i and . Write a i and a i for the smallest and largest actions in ; i ; i ;
and the limit points are given by:
Lemma 4
For each i and i 2 i , For su ciently small " > 0, this will be an ICE by construction: note that type i of player i puts probability 1 on r i i ; i , so r i ( i ) is a best response while type i of player i puts probability 1 on r i i ; i , so r i i is a best response; genericity ensures that for each j 6 = i, r j j is unique maximizer of u j a j ; r j j ; j ; j and therefore it remains a maximizer if he puts probability 1 " on r j j ; j and probability " on r i ( i ) ; r i;j j ; i ; i;j .
In a generic supermodular game, we observe the following additional results.
Corollary 2
If each R i is single valued, then:
2. the best response r i ( i ) is given by:
3. is an ICE if and only if = ;r for some 2 ( ).
(1) follows from lemma 4. (2) follows from the de nitions of r i and r i and the niteness of each A i and i . For (3), (2) implies that every of this form is an ICE and Proposition 4 implies that every ICE must be of this form.
Potential Games and Unique ICE
We return to the compact continuous case. We say that a game u has weighted potential
for all i, a i ; a 0 i 2 A i , a i 2 A i i 2 i and i 2 i . This is a belief free incomplete information generalization of the de nition of a weighted potential in Monderer and Shapley (1996) ; 4 in particular, it is equivalent to requiring that each incomplete information game
is a weighted potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) , using the same weights for each 2 . Game u has a best response potential v :
This is a an incomplete information generalization of a best response potential in Morris and Ui (2004) . Note in particular that if v is a weighted potential for u, it is also a best response potential for u. We say that v is a strictly concave potential if v ( ; ) is a strictly concave function of a for all 2 .
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness)
If u has a strictly concave smooth potential function and an ex post equilibrium s, then is an incomplete information correlated equilibrium of u if and only if there exists 2 ( ) such that = ;s .
Proof. Neyman (1997) shows that if a complete information game v ( ; ) (for xed ) has a strictly concave potential, then the unique correlated equilibrium is the unique pure strategy pro le maximizing v ( ; ). Thus we have that
for all 2 . We adapt the proof by Neyman (1997) to our belief free incomplete information environment. We consider an arbitrary correlated equilibrium given by 2 (A ) and show that -if it is not generated by the ex post equilibrium -there exists an improvement for at least one agent i. At any (a; ) 2 A with a 6 = s ( ), we know that We know that for all a 6 = s ( ), we have
Now suppose that 6 = ;s . Then taking expectations over (a; ) we have Thus the deviation i (a i ; i ) = "s i ( i ) + (1 ")a i would strictly increase agent i's ex ante utility for su ciently small " > 0.
We can apply this result to derive our characterization of C i ( i ) in the quadratic example of Section 3.2.
Corollary 3 (Quadratic Game)
The quadratic common interest game has a smooth concave potential if and only if
Proof. Since it was a game of common interests and the payo s were quadratic, we have the existence and smoothness of the potential function. Now we establish the conditions for concavity. The rst derivative is Now if M is the (constant) Hessian and x 2 R I , then the quadratic form is: If > 1, and x 1 = z > 0, x 2 = z and x 3 = = x I = 0, then
(1 ) 1 I 1 1 and is negative de nite if 1 I 1 < < 1.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to collect and compare belief free solution concepts in games of incomplete information. Among these three concepts under consideration, the notion of ex post equilibrium has received the widest attention in the context of mechanism design.
By comparing and relating these solution concepts, it was our objective to emphasize the properties common to these belief free notions in a general game theoretic environment rather than the special setting of mechanism design.
It is important to emphasize that all of these notions do not impose any restrictions on the distributions over the payo types. A natural question which we hope to address in the future is how the predictions, in particular of the incomplete information correlated equilibrium, would be re ned if we were to consider a given prior over payo types, yet allow for all possible belief type spaces which could be generated by a common prior type space.
This intermediate scenario is interesting as the players (and the outside observer) may have learned or otherwise acquired information about the frequency of the payo types, yet have very little information about the current beliefs and higher order beliefs of the agents.
